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Forthcoming in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 
 
Expressivism, Inferentialism, and Saving the Debate 
Matthew Chrisman 
University of Edinburgh 
 
I. Introduction 
It is common to distinguish between theoretical and practical reasoning. For 
example, my partner and I are expecting the Joneses for dinner. They call to let 
us know that they’re headed out the door, and we then reason as follows: “They 
called to let us know they’re headed out the door, their trip will take about 
twenty minutes, so they’ll be here in about twenty minutes. The quiche needs to 
bake for thirty minutes, we want it to be ready shortly after the Joneses arrive, 
they’ll arrive in about twenty minutes, so we should put the quiche in the oven 
now.” In this case, we first infer a theoretical conclusion from evidential reasons, 
and then we infer a practical conclusion from instrumental reasons. There is a 
strong tradition in philosophy that treats these as paradigms of two 
fundamentally different ways of reasoning. Spelling out the difference is a 
difficult theoretical task, but it seems clear enough from this example that 
theoretical and practical reasoning have different (although importantly 
connected) functions in our cognitive lives. Theoretical reasoning aims to 
expand our knowledge of how the world is. Practical reasoning aims to expand 
our knowledge of how to behave in the world as we know it to be. 
Although this distinction between theoretical and practical reasoning is 
notoriously central to normative ethical theorizing, its significance has, I think, 
been underappreciated and misconstrued in the metaethical debate about 
realism. I suspect that this is the result of two aspects of that debate: (a) the 
realism debate has been pursued (mostly) by investigating the appropriate 
semantic account of ethical statements, (b) all of the prominent semantic 
accounts on offer, both realist and irrealist, take representation rather than 
inference as their master concept, which leaves the distinction between ways of 
reasoning as explanatorily posterior to the distinction between representational 
and nonrepresentational items.  
Aspect (a) is not obviously beyond reproach—perhaps the reality of moral 
properties should be investigated by strictly metaphysical rather than semantic 
methods. However, for the purposes of this paper, I shall not reproach the 
methodological mindset that semanticizes the realism debate in metaethics. This 
is because it is by working within this mindset that I think we have best hope of 
correcting the mistake I see embodied in aspect (b) and gaining a fuller 
 2 
appreciation of the significance of the distinction between theoretical and 
practical reasoning to the realism debate. Thus, my overarching aim in this 
paper is to begin to explore what happens to that debate when we take inference 
rather than representation as our master concept in philosophical semantics. 
More specifically, I want to consider the fortunes of the most prominent form of 
irrealism—expressivism—and urge that a new form of this position, which takes 
the distinction between theoretical and practical reasoning (rather than the 
distinction between representational and nonrepresentational mental states) as 
basic, has the resources to address one of the main objections threatening 
contemporary versions of the view. 
 
II. What Expressivism is for 
One perspicuous way to understand the role of expressivism in metaethical 
debates of the past century is as a semantic solution to an epistemological and 
ontological problem. The epistemological and ontological problem is that sui 
generis ethical facts with a character of objective to-be-doneness are hard to fit 
into a naturalistic conception of the world and our access to it. As Blackburn 
puts the point, “The natural world is the world revealed by the senses, and 
described by the natural sciences…However we think of it ethics seems to fit 
badly into that world”(1998: 48). The expressivist solution to this, what we 
might call, problem of naturalism is best understood in contrast to its best 
known alternatives. One alternative is to endorse an error-theory about ethical 
discourse—ethical statements are like statements about witches in that in 
making them people erroneously presuppose the existence of something that 
does not exist.1 A second alternative is to deny that the problem is a problem by 
rejecting the naturalistic conception of the world—ethical facts are nonnatural 
and we have a special moral intuition by which we can know them.2 A third 
alternative is to argue that a proper construal of ethical facts can locate them in 
the natural world as a type of natural fact to which we have access—ethical facts 
either reduce to or just are natural facts which are in principle knowable by 
empirical means.3 Expressivists reject each of these solutions to the problem of 
naturalism, which means that they (i) affirm the legitimacy of ordinary ethical 
discourse (as it now stands), (ii) deny the existence of nonnatural facts, and (iii) 
deny that putative ethical facts are or reduce to nonethical natural facts. In doing 
so, the expressivist’s characteristic move is to identify and reject a common 
                                                
1 See Mackie (1977: ch. 1). 
2 See Moore (1903) and for updated and more plausible versions of this option Shafer-Landau 
(2003) and Regan (2003). 
3 See Lycan (1988). Boyd (1988), Brink (1986, 2001), and Sturgeon (1984) defend similar 
views but are more conservative about claiming the reduction of ethical properties to natural 
properties. 
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semantic assumption of each of the three alternatives—viz. that the meaning of 
ethical statements should be understood in terms of the facts they represent or 
(on a particular way of understanding this notion) in terms of their truth-
conditions. So characterized, however, expressivism is a negative thesis in need 
of a positive answer to the following question: if the meaning of ethical 
statements is not to be understood in terms of what fact they represent, then 
how is it to be understood?  
Famously, Ayer’s “Emotive Theory of Value” offers a particularly 
audacious and stark answer to this question. He claimed that, “insofar as 
statements of value are significant, they are ordinary ‘scientific’ statements; and 
…insofar as they are not scientific, they are not in the literal sense significant, 
but are simply expressions of emotion which can be neither true nor false”(1946: 
102-103). According to Ayer, the first of these two category includes mixed 
statements that might be thought to express both an ethical and nonethical 
judgment—e.g., “You acted wrongly in stealing that money”—and derivative 
ethical statements that appear to express ethical judgments but are really what 
Ayer calls “factual classification of an action as belonging to some class of 
actions by which a certain moral attitude on the part of the speaker is habitually 
aroused”(Ibid: 21). The focus of Ayer’s theory is the second more basic category, 
i.e. pure ethical statements which express only moral judgments. He claimed 
that these are not literally significant. 
Even given the distinction between mixed statements and factual 
classifications, on the one hand, and pure ethical statements, on the other, the 
emotivist thesis about the meaning of ethical statements seems highly dubious; 
for, according to it, the statement “You acted wrongly in stealing that money” 
has the same significance as “You stole that money”, and the statement “Stealing 
is wrong” has no significance at all. However, to find this highly dubious is to fail 
to recognize Ayer’s distinction between the genus meaningful and one of its 
species literally significant.4 On Ayer’s stipulative usage, only those statements 
which are analytic or in principle verifiable express propositions, and only those 
statements which express propositions are literally significant.5 So, as a thesis 
about the meaning of ethical statements, emotivism comes to the claim that, 
because (pure) ethical statements (and the ethical parts of mixed statements) are 
not verifiable, they are meaningful in some other way than as being literal 
significant.  
                                                
4 Compare Miller (1998). 
5 To be perfectly precise, I should say that on Ayer’s view only those sentences which are 
analytic or verifiable express propositions. This is because, on Ayer’s usage, a “statement” is just 
whatever content is expressed by indicative sentences, whether or not they are verifiable or analytic, 
and a “proposition” is the content expressed by verifiable or analytic sentences.(1946: 8) I think this 
use of ‘statement’ is confusing and won’t follow Ayer in it here. 
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Notoriously, Ayer himself offered very little explanation of the alternative 
sense in which he thought pure ethical statements are meaningful. It is clear 
that he thought that their meaning was some sort of nonrepresentational 
meaning, which is why he claimed that “they are pure expressions of feeling and 
as such do not come under the category of truth and falsehood” and they “are 
calculated to arouse feeling, and so to stimulate action”(Ibid.: 108). This 
suggests that we could explain the meaning of pure ethical statements by 
coordinating their use with various feelings typically conveyed and aroused. It’s 
not that ethical statements say that the speaker has certain feelings—that would 
be subjectivism—rather it’s that their meaning is explained indirectly in terms of 
the mental states they convey and evoke. Ayer, however, was skeptical about 
how much philosophy can add to a positive account of the meaning of pure 
ethical statements: “We find that ethical philosophy consists simply in saying 
that ethical concepts are pseudo-concepts and therefore unanalyzable”(Ibid: 
112). What is important to notice here is that when we understand concepts as 
the most basic components of representation, then Ayer’s claim makes sense as 
a way to deny that ethical statements have any straightforwardly 
representational sort of meaning. 
Although some still think of expressivism as basically a variant on Ayer’s 
emotivism, most contemporary expressivists recognize and are responsive to a 
deep problem in Ayer’s stark approach to the semantics of ethical discourse. The 
problem is that ethical statements and descriptive statements manifest clear 
semantic similarities that Ayer’s stark semantic thesis cannot account for. For 
instance, just like descriptive statements, ethical statements seem to be built out 
of subsentential components which contribute in systematic ways to the overall 
meaning of the statements; just like descriptive statements, ethical statements 
admit of systematic syntactic transformations of tense, mood, number, etc.; 
moreover, just like descriptive statements, ethical statements seem to be truth-
apt which allows them to embed in logically complex contexts and bear logical 
relations to other statements.6 By drawing the expressive contrast between 
descriptive statements and ethical statements with the claim that the former 
express propositions and the latter express feelings and attitudes, Ayer’s account 
provides a powerful, albeit blunt, instrument for construing ethical statements 
as semantically different from descriptive statements. For that, however, his 
account appears to wipe out the resources needed to adequately capture the 
ways in which ethical and descriptive statements are semantically similar and 
                                                
6 This final aspect of similarity is related to the infamous Frege-Geach problem—see Geach 
(1965). Certainly, one of the central motivations for modifying expressivism in the ways I go on to 
discuss below has been the Frege-Geach problem. Here, I will be concerned with another sort of 
problem that attaches directly to those modifications rather than with the issue of whether those 
modifications provide adequate resources for answering the Frege-Geach problem. 
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thereby integrate an account of the meaning of ethical statements into a 
plausible general semantic theory.7  
Thus, while sympathizing with Ayer’s view that ethical statements are 
semantically different from descriptive statements in a way that provides a 
distinctively expressivist solution to the problem of naturalism, contemporary 
expressivists hold out hope for a semantic account that integrates the distinctive 
meaning of ethical statements into a general philosophical account of meaning 
in such a way that both the semantic differences and semantic similarities 
between descriptive and ethical statements can be explained. From the point of 
view of contemporary expressivists, the key to this project is to psychologize all 
semantic explanation by starting from the idea that all statements 
conventionally express mental states of some sort or other, and the mental state 
conventionally expressed by a statement is what confers its semantic content. 
Then, they seek to capture the semantic difference between ethical and 
descriptive statements in explicitly psychological terms.  
For example, Gibbard writes, “Just as a straightforwardly factual assertion 
expresses a straightforwardly factual belief, so an assertion that such-and-such 
is rational expresses a normative judgment”(1990: 84). And later, he contrasts 
expressivism with the pursuit of direct definitions of normative terms writing, 
“The expressivists’ strategy is to change the question. Don’t ask directly how to 
define ‘good’…Ask what states of mind ethical statements express”(2003: 6). 
Similarly, Blackburn writes,  
What is needed…is not the suggestion that evaluative predicates 
refer to whatever properties ground the values. We need to 
understand the special take on those properties had by those who 
value them one way or another. Until we have a theory of that, we do 
not understand anything of ethical thought, the content of the ethical 
proposition, its motivational power, its authority, and the question of 
whether disputes involving different valuations are cognitive 
disputes or something else. All of these are better understood by 
expressivism than by the approaches considered in this chapter 
[response-dependent accounts and Cornell realism].(1998: 121) 
And he characterizes expressivism writing, “Expressivism denies that when we 
assert values, we talk about our own states of mind, in actual or potential 
circumstances. It says that we voice our states of mind, but denies that we 
                                                
7 Of course, Ayer himself was operating with a verificationist theory of meaning, and was 
therefore perfectly happy to dismiss the question of how ethical and descriptive statements were 
semantically similar as a bad question generated by a sloppy analysis of language. See Ayer (1946: 20, 
31). However, in our post-positivistic period, this stance towards understanding the meaning of ethical 
statements seems, to put it charitably, under-motivated. 
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thereby describe them”(Ibid.: 50). Thus, expressivism is characterized as an 
“indirect” account of the meaning of terms. Here’s Gibbard again: “The term 
‘expressivism’ I mean to cover any account of meanings that follows this indirect 
path: to explain the meaning of a term, explain what states of mind the term can 
be used to express”(2003: 7). And although Gibbard identifies this approach 
with expressivism, notice that it is perfectly general and does not have anything 
specifically to do with metaethics; it is a familiar idea from the general 
psychologistic approaches to semantics that seek to explain the meaning of any 
term by explaining what states of mind it can be used to express.8  
Of course, for the expressivist it is important that ethical statements be 
thought to express an importantly different kind of mental state than that 
expressed by descriptive statements. For example, Blackburn writes,  
The theory I want to defend is one that gives a story about the way in 
which ethical thought functions. Valuing something, it says, is not to 
be understood as describing certain terms, any more than hoping for 
or desiring something are describing it in particular terms. Rather, 
the state of mind of one who values something is distinctive, but 
nevertheless it is itself a natural, and naturally describable, 
state.(1998: 49) 
And Gibbard writes, 
At the outset, in any expressivist’s scheme, the initial states of mind 
are explained not as beliefs with such-and-such content, but in some 
other way. They are explained psychologically, as sentiments or 
attitudes, perhaps, or as universal preferences, states of norm-
acceptance—or states of planning.(2003: 180-181) 
From this perspective, Ayer’s mistake seems to have been, in effect, to 
think that ethical statements express their contents in a completely different way 
than descriptive statements express their semantic contents. Rather than mark a 
representational-nonrepresentational divide by holding that the meaning of 
descriptive statements can be explained directly in terms of the propositions 
they express, while the meaning of ethical statements should be explained in 
terms of the feelings and attitudes they express, contemporary expressivists seek 
to reconstitute the representational-nonrepresentational divide in wholly 
psychological terms. The idea is to say that both descriptive and ethical 
statements express mental states responsible for the meaning of the statements; 
it’s just that descriptive statements express a genuinely representational sort of 
mental state while ethical statements express some nonrepresentational sort of 
mental state. As I see things, the key dialectical advantage of this move is that it 
                                                
8 Compare Grice (1989), Schiffer (1974), Blackburn (1984), Davis (2003).  
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allows expressivists to distance themselves from the untoward implications of 
Ayer’s emotivism. They are no longer forced to construe ethical statements as 
not propositional or not significant. Of course, they then owe us an alternative 
account of the meaning of ethical statements, but they have a philosophical 
tradition tracing back to Locke and the rich field of psychological concepts and 
distinctions at their disposal.  
However, whatever the precise account of the mental state expressed by 
ethical statements is, it seems that expressivists will have to say that it has a lot 
of the same semantic properties as a belief. For, given expressivists’ fully 
psychologistic approach to semantics, this will be the only way to capture the 
semantic similarities between descriptive and ethical statements. This is why the 
quote from Gibbard continues,  
The expressivist then tries to show that these states of mind act 
much like beliefs: it is as if they were beliefs with a special kind of 
content. Some expressivists at the point debunk; the story, they say, 
shows why these seeming beliefs are mere pseudo-beliefs. A quasi-
realist like me stresses the vast extent of the parallel between 
normative convictions, as they emerge in the theory, and the plainest 
cases of belief in realistic content.(Ibid: 181) 
 
III. Quasi-Realism, Creeping Minimalism, and Dreier’s Proposal 
The badge “quasi-realist” that Gibbard here takes for his position deserves 
elucidation. As we saw, emotivists like Ayer hold that ethical statements are not 
truth-apt. And, at one point Gibbard too held this view. About the expressivist 
view of ascriptions of rationality defended in his first book, he writes, “The 
analysis is non-cognitivistic in the narrow sense that, according to it, to call a 
thing rational is not to state a matter of fact, either truly or falsely”(1990:8). 
However, this feature of the traditional expressivist view has received much 
appropriate critical attention over the years. For, whatever plausibility 
traditional expressivism gains by providing a semantic solution to the problem 
of naturalism it seems to lose by disrespecting the surface phenomena of 
ordinary ethical discourse, since it is just as easy to moralize with the statement, 
“Invading Iraq was wrong” as with the statement, “It’s true that invading Iraq 
was wrong.” It seems, therefore, that traditional expressivism is able to affirm 
the legitimacy of only part of ordinary ethical discourse; it must be implicitly 
committed to an error-theory about the ordinary use of the truth-predicate in 
conjunction with ethical statements. Because of this internal tension in 
traditional expressivism and as part of their attempt to integrate an expressivist 
account of the meaning of ethical sentences into a general semantic account, 
contemporary expressivists have sought to divide (i) the claim that ethical 
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statements do not express propositions and are thus not truth-apt, from (ii) the 
claim that the meaning of ethical statements is to be given by showing how the 
psychological state they can be used to express differs from the psychological 
state descriptive sentences can be used to express.  
Now expressivists, such as Blackburn and Gibbard, want to deny (i) while 
affirming (ii), and their strategy for doing so is to adopt some form of 
minimalism about the semantic terms ‘truth’ and ‘proposition’. This is, roughly, 
the view that the phrase ‘the proposition that’ is just a grammatical device that 
we use to form noun-phrases out of indicative sentences, so all instances of the 
schema: 
 ‘S’ expresses the proposition that-S, 
where an indicative sentence is substituted for S, are true. And the phrase ‘is 
true’ is just a grammatical device that we use to form a sentence out of a name 
for a proposition, so all instances of the schema: 
 ‘P’ is true iff P, 
where P can be any proposition, which, given minimalism about propositions, 
means that any indicative sentence can be substituted for P.9 
 This combination of the expressivist approach to the semantics of ethical 
discourse with minimalism about truth and proposition is the beginning of what 
Blackburn and (following him) Gibbard have called “quasi-realism”.10 The 
adoption of minimalism lets quasi-realists recognize as legitimate—in a way that 
Ayer couldn’t—the use of the terms ‘proposition’ and ‘true’ in ordinary ethical 
discourse. However, quasi-realists maintain with Ayer that there is a 
psychological difference in what kind of mental state ethical and descriptive 
statements can be used to express.  
It is crucial for understanding the dialectical liabilities of quasi-realism to 
notice that this psychological difference can be no merely pragmatic matter. 
Many sorts of statements can be differentiated in terms of what type of mental 
state they express. For example, first-personal avowals of emotions—e.g. “I love 
you”—express the relevant emotion, and simple requests—e.g. “I’d like eggs”—
express desires, but that does not imply that we should treat them semantically 
as nonrepresentational.11 So for expressivism to continue to bear on the 
                                                
9 Similar remarks apply to notions such as ‘reference’ and ‘fact’, but I shall leave these implicit 
in what follows. For more direct defenses of minimalism see especially Field (1986), Horwich (1990), 
and Wright (1992). 
10 Blackburn (1984, 1993, 1998); Gibbard (2003). 
11 Of course, on some deflationary accounts of self-knowledge such avowals are treated as 
nonrepresentational, but I think these accounts are making the same mistake as would be made by an 
expressivist who inferred from the mere fact that ethical statements express attitudes that ethical 
claims are nonrepresentational. See Bar-On (2004: 226-284) for more discussion of simple 
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epistemological and ontological problem of naturalism, it has to treat the 
psychological difference in what kind of mental state ethical and descriptive 
statements can be used to express as making the crucial semantic difference 
between ethical and descriptive statements.12 
What does “the crucial semantic difference” mean? It cannot mean just 
any semantic difference. For surely an ethical statement such as “Magnanimity 
is good” is semantically different from a descriptive statement such as “The sky 
is blue” in that these statements mobilize different kinds of concepts—ethical 
concepts and color concepts. However, that semantic difference does not by 
itself help with the problem of naturalism, since another uncontroversially 
descriptive statement such as “The road is icy” mobilizes another kind of concept 
still—a road condition concept—without implying anything about the ontological 
commitments of road condition discourse vis-à-vis color discourse. The relevant 
difference must be, it seems, something like the difference between 
psychological states that purport to represent the world and those that do not. 
However, the quasi-realists’ ability to cogently appeal to that distinction has 
begun to seem problematic, and with this, the very intelligibility of the 
metaethical debate about realism has begun to seem problematic.13  
The problem is in containing the imperialistic tendencies of minimalism. 
Quasi-realists endorse minimalism about ‘truth’ and ‘proposition’ in order to 
avoid the untoward implications of Ayer’s emotivism. Initially, this forces us to 
recast the realism-irrealism debate in psychological terms: realists hold that 
ethical statements express beliefs and some of those beliefs are true. Irrealists 
deny that ethical statements express beliefs (although, as quasi-realists, they will 
now admit that some ethical statements are true, in a minimalist sense of 
                                                                                                                                                                 
expressivist accounts of avowals and argument against this inference. See Dreier (1990), Copp (2001), 
Barker (2000), and Finlay (2004, 2005) for views that treat ethical statements as expressing attitudes 
but construe this as part of the pragmatics of ethical statements rather than the semantics. 
12 Thus, I think it is no innocent move for Gibbard (2003) to start with a distinction in terms of 
pragmatic force between factual and plan-laden statements—i.e. a distinction in what one is doing 
when one makes the relevant statements—and then transmutes this into a semantic distinction. He 
writes, “In a different and more traditional sense, one could treat belief that I am about to pack and a 
decision to pack as having the same ‘content’, that I will forthwith pack, toward which I take different 
propositional attitudes: belief, and deciding to actualize. The two attitudes have different “directions of 
fit”. We can say, towards the same item of ‘content’. Here, though, I am opting to transmute force into 
content: I speak of a single attitude ‘accepting’ that one can take towards distinct items of content, that 
I will forthwith pack and the plan to pack”(2003: 47) He goes on to claim that his idiosyncratic use of 
‘content’ is optional, but what is not optional for the expressivist is that the pragmatic-psychological 
distinction between ethical and descriptive statements make the right sort of semantic difference in 
one’s account of the meaning of those statements. 
13 This problem has been most forcefully articulated in Dreier (2004), and following three 
paragraphs draw heavily on his way of pressing the issue. 
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‘true’).14 However, the main reason for quasi-realists to adopt minimalism about 
‘true’ and ‘proposition’ was to show how they can capture the aspects of ordinary 
ethical discourse that tempt people to reject Ayer’s emotivist irrealism in favor of 
realism.15 But if that is the theoretical motivation for adopting minimalism about 
‘truth’ and ‘proposition’, it is not clear how casting the debate in wholly 
psychological terms is any more friendly to expressivistic irrealism. For it is also 
a feature of ordinary ethical discourse to say things such as “I believe that 
torture is always wrong.” Moreover, as Divers and Miller have stressed in this 
context, two apparent platitudes connect truth-evaluability to the expression of 
beliefs—viz., a truth-evaluable statement is an assertion, and an assertion is the 
expression of a belief.(1994: 14-15)16 So, if the expressivist uses minimalism 
about truth to win the right to view ethical statements truth-evaluable, then it 
seems forced on him to view ethical statements as assertions and, in turn, the 
expression of beliefs.  
There is a response available, but it is dangerous. Minimalism about ‘belief 
would say that there is nothing more to a statement’s expressing a belief than its 
being an assertion, and there is nothing more to a statement’s being an assertion 
than its being truth-apt. Quasi-realists can also “go minimalist” about ‘belief’ in 
order to capture the psychological features of ordinary ethical discourse that still 
tempt towards realism even once the debate is cast in wholly psychological 
terms. But in so doing they seem to lose the debate. For now they are forced to 
say that ethical statements express beliefs (minimalistically construed), which 
leaves it questionable what distinguishes them from realists. This is why Dreier 
claims that, “Minimalism sucks the substance out of heavy-duty metaphysical 
concept. If successful, it can help Expressivism recapture the ordinary realist 
language of ethics. But in so doing it also threatens to make irrealism 
indistinguishable from realism”(2004: 26). 
As Dreier notes, some philosophers have reacted to this problem by trying 
to recast the realism-irrealism debate wholly within the psychological category 
of (minimalist) belief. That is they want to allow that both descriptive and ethical 
statements express beliefs, but they hold that the former statements express 
                                                
14 Another way to be an irrealist is to follow the realist in holding that ethical statements 
express beliefs but then deny that any positive atomic ethical statements are true. This is a version of 
the error-theoretic option mentioned above. For the most part, I will leave it out of the discussion to 
follow and focus on versions of expressivism. 
15 Indeed, given Ayer’s own proto-minimalist account of truth, even he should have held that 
ethical sentences are truth-apt. He writes, “Reverting to the analysis of truth, we find that in all 
sentences of the form ‘p is true,’ the phrase ‘is true’ is logically superfluous…we conclude, then, that 
there is no problem of truth as it is ordinarily conceived. The traditional conception of truth as a ‘real 
quality’ or ‘real relation’ is due, like most philosophical mistakes, to a failure to analyse sentences 
correctly”(1946: 88-89; quoted in Dreier 2004: 24).  
16 Compare also Wright (1992: 14). 
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representational beliefs while the latter statements express nonrepresentational 
beliefs.17 But founding one’s expressivist irrealism on this distinction is apt to 
seem folly given the momentum of minimalism’s imperialistic tendencies. For, 
as Dreier claims, “there is plainly an ordinary sense of ‘representation’ that 
applies full well to moral beliefs”(2004: 29), which is a reflection of the analytic 
connections between truth-aptness, assertion, belief, and representation. So, if it 
is really important to the plausibility of expressivism that it capture the 
apparently realist-sounding surface phenomena of moral discourse, then it 
appears that expressivists should adopt minimalist approaches to these 
alternative ways of making out the necessary distinction. So, pressure to 
accommodate the surface phenomena of ordinary moral discourse, which has 
encouraged expressivists to adopt minimalism about ‘truth’ and ‘proposition’, 
continues to put pressure on quasi-realistic versions of expressivism that seek to 
mark out the relevant distinction with notions like ‘belief’, ‘descriptive’, or 
‘represents’. This is what Dreier calls the problem of creeping minimalism: 
“Once minimalism gets creeping, it’s hard to see how to stop it”(2004: 29).18 
But, as a form of expressivism, quasi-realism seems to be proposed as the 
best possible irrealist position. If it turns out to be indistinguishable from forms 
of realism, then the expressivist has again lost the debate. Now, at this point in 
the discussion, an expressivist irrealist might grant Dreier’s point that, when the 
realism-irrealism distinction is couched in terms deployed as part of the surface 
phenomena of ordinary ethical discourse, ordinary ethical discourse implicitly 
endorses realism. But the expressivist could nonetheless insist that it remains 
possible to couch the distinction in terms that clearly are not deployed as part of 
the surface phenomena of ordinary ethical discourse. This would undermine the 
dialectical force of the putatively realist-sounding aspects of ordinary ethical 
discourse, and there would then be no pressure to let minimalism undermine 
the distinction between realism and irrealism.  
                                                
17 Compare Timmons (1999). 
18 Teemu Toppinen has suggested to me that there is a distinction that can be made between 
two ordinary senses of ‘belief’—“minimal belief” and “robust belief”—where the former is whatever 
conforms to the platitudes connecting belief to truth and assertion, and the later is whatever conforms 
to the platitudes emerging from a belief-desire psychology of action. If this distinction can hold up 
against minimalism, then the expressivist could claim that ordinary ascriptions of moral beliefs 
require the mental state expressed by ethical claims to be only a minimal belief, while what 
distinguishes them from realists is that they deny that ethical statements express robust beliefs. 
However, I doubt that there are “platitudes” emerging from belief-desire psychology of action, and, 
even if there are, it is far from clear that ordinary discourse doesn’t implicitly treat the mental state 
expressed by ethical statements as what Toppinen is calling a robust belief. For notice that it is often 
an acceptable way to explain why someone did what she did—e.g. quit her job—by appealing to her 
belief that doing so was the right thing to do. 
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In fact, this seems to be the strategy explicitly pursued by Gibbard (2003). 
He stipulates technical meanings for the phrases “the thing to do” and “plan-
laden”, writing:  
Suppose, let me stipulate, the phrase works like this: to conclude, say, 
that fleeing the building is the thing to do just is to conclude what to 
do, to settle on fleeing the building. By sheer stipulation then, the 
meaning of this phrase ‘the thing to do’ is explained 
expressivistically: if I assert “Fleeing is the thing to do”, I thereby 
express a state of mind, deciding to flee.(2003: 15) 
Why is “deciding to flee” counted as a “state of mind”? Since Gibbard pursues a 
psychologistic semantics and wants ultimately to explain the meaning of ethical 
statements in terms of the states of mind they express, this conclusion about 
what to do has to be a state of mind to play the necessary role in his semantics. 
Indeed, with the help of minimalism, this state of mind ultimately comes to be 
called a belief in Gibbard’s theory, but it is a “plan-laden” belief which 
distinguishes it from a “prosaically factual” belief.(Ibid.: 7, 185-188) Thus, in 
Gibbard’s view, the crucial semantic difference between descriptive and ethical 
statements is the type of belief they express—plan-laden or prosaically factual. 
This is a technical psychological distinction, but it is supposed to track a real 
distinction between kinds of beliefs that can be put to service in explaining the 
semantic difference between descriptive statements and ethical statements. And, 
initially, it is hard to see how minimalism could creep in and undermine it, since 
it is unclear what it would even mean to take up a minimalist approach towards 
the distinction between plan-laden and prosaically factual beliefs. I guess one 
could insist that all beliefs are prosaically factual, but there would be no pressure 
from ordinary ethical discourse to do so.19 
 I think Gibbard’s move here is definitely a step in the right direction for 
saving the realism-irrealism debate. However, one might reasonably wonder 
whether Gibbard’s view—with its adoption of minimalism and psychological 
distinction made in technical terms—continues to be a recognizably 
expressivistic solution to the problem of naturalism. How, that is, does the view 
that ethical claims express plan-laden beliefs make out room for (i) affirming the 
legitimacy of ordinary ethical discourse (as it now stands), while (ii) denying the 
existence of nonnatural ethical facts, and (iii) denying that ethical facts are or 
otherwise can be reduced to natural facts? To put the worry a different way: 
                                                
19 Compare also the alternative proposal in Ridge (forthcoming) where he distinguishes 
between beliefs in the sense of whatever causally regulates ordinary use of the word ‘belief’ (i.e. mental 
states expressed by assertions) and beliefs in the sense of the natural-psychological kind of mental 
state posited by a mature cognitive science. He thinks that the former category includes the latter as a 
proper subset, and the mental state expressed by ethical claims is not purely a belief of the latter 
category. 
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what if the realist says that he agrees with Gibbard—ethical beliefs are plan-
laden, which he takes to mean that they represent certain actions as being the 
actions we should engage in? Would this be an incoherent form of realism? It 
doesn’t seem so, and because of this, it is not clear that it constitutes a rejection 
of realism to say that the beliefs expressed by ethical statements are plan-laden. 
This is a reflection of something that we have already learned: It is not enough 
just to characterize the psychological nature of ethical beliefs and then just say 
that the beliefs expressed by uncontroversially descriptive statements are 
semantically different; after all, beliefs about road conditions are semantically 
different from beliefs about colors, which are, in turn, semantically different 
from beliefs about good and bad character traits. In order to offer an expressivist 
solution to the problem of naturalism, one needs to go further and say why the 
putative difference between plan-laden beliefs and prosaically factual beliefs 
makes a difference to the epistemological and ontological status of ethical 
discourse. Otherwise, one has not saved the debate. 
Dreier attempts a tentative answer to this challenge on Gibbard’s behalf.20 
He articulates his proposal as an interpretation of Gibbard’s suggestion that, “To 
explain belief in natural fact adequately, we must assume a natural world of 
which we are a part. We must start with a realm of naturalistic facts. To explain 
belief in normative facts, in contrast, we need not start with a realm of 
normative facts…”(2003: 183). It is important to note that Gibbard is not talking 
about what explains why a true belief is true; he wants his account of the kind of 
mental state expressed by ethical statements to apply both to true and false 
ethical statements. This is in part why Dreier interprets Gibbard’s notion of 
‘explanation’ along the lines of Fine (2001) writing: “The explanation of your 
belief that the moon is a quarter of a million miles away, in this context, is that 
in virtue of which it is true to say of you that you believe it. And Gibbard is 
speculating that an account of what naturalistic belief consists in will appeal to 
naturalistic facts”(2004: 38). And he could have added: on this interpretation, 
Gibbard’s view is that an adequate account of what normative belief consists in 
will not appeal to normative facts. Dreier calls this the “explanation” explanation 
of the distinction between realism and irrealism. According to it, if one thinks 
that the explanation of that in virtue of which one counts as having a normative 
belief requires appeal to normative facts, then one is a normative realist, 
otherwise, one is a normative irrealist. 
However, it is not immediately clear what it means to appeal to certain 
kinds of facts in the explanation of that in virtue of which one counts as having 
certain kinds of beliefs. Are the facts appealed to the ones believed in? Dreier 
                                                
20 Dreier (2004.: 32-39) drawing on O’Leary-Hawthorne and Price (1996), Gibbard (2003), 
and Fine (2001). 
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considers the question of whether Gibbard’s realism about naturalistic beliefs 
comes to the view that an account of what the beliefs consist in will appeal “to 
the very facts that are also the objects of beliefs?” He writes, “Gibbard is not 
specific…but I don’t see why he would resist [this] suggestion”(2004: 44). 
However, it seems to me that Gibbard should resist this suggestion. For suppose 
Joey believes that the planet Krypton is made of kryptonite; clearly, neither the 
cosmological realist nor the cosmological irrealist will want to appeal to the fact 
that Krypton is made of kryptonite in explaining that in virtue of which Joey 
counts as having the cosmological belief that he does—for this is not really a fact. 
So, it cannot be true, in general, that the realist will appeal to the very facts 
believed in to explain that in virtue of which someone counts as having those 
beliefs. 
But what facts, then, are the relevant facts that one must appeal to in the 
explanation of Joey’s belief in order to count as a realist? Will the cosmological 
realist nonetheless appeal to other cosmological facts in explaining Joey’s 
cosmological beliefs? I don’t see why. Regarding the belief that the moon is 
roughly a quarter of a million miles away, Dreier writes, “…a realist about the 
moon should say that belief that the moon is a quarter of a million miles away 
consists in some fact that includes the moon, presumably the fact of standing in 
some representation relation to the moon”(2004: 44). However, not any relata 
of the representation relation will do the job here; indeed, it seems like we need 
it to be a representation of the fact that the moon is a quarter of a million miles 
away. But this won’t do as a general characterization of realism. For, what about 
Suzy who believes that the moon is made of cheese? The realist about the moon 
will not want to appeal to the fact that Suzy stands in the representation relation 
to the fact that the moon is made of cheese, since this is not a fact. There is no 
fact that the moon is made of cheese to which Suzy can stand in a representation 
relation. So appeal to such a (putative) fact cannot be part of the best 
explanation of that in virtue of which Suzy counts as believing in what she does 
about the moon. 
What we seem to need here is the fact that Suzy represents the moon as 
being made of cheese and the fact that Joey represents Krypton as being made of 
kryptonite and the fact that we represent the moon as being roughly a quarter of 
a million miles away. These are all facts that one might appeal to in explaining 
that in virtue of which Suzy, Joey, and we have the relevant cosmological beliefs. 
And, if this is a mark of realism, then the normative realist would say that the 
normative belief, e.g., that stealing is wrong is explained by the fact that the 
believer represents stealing as wrong, while the irrealist would give some other 
explanation (perhaps, that the believer has adopted a plan not to steal). 
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With this, however, we seem to be back to conceiving of the distinction 
between realism and irrealism in terms of the distinction between 
representational and nonrepresentational mental states. And that surely spells 
trouble for Dreier’s proposal, since he has already shown us what is wrong with 
using ‘representation’ as a way to distinguish expressivists from realists: it is 
open to the imperialistic aspirations of creeping minimalism.  
 
IV. An Inferentialist Alternative 
So far, we have seen that expressivists want to articulate a distinction between 
what ethical statements express and what uncontroversially descriptive claims 
express, and this distinction must be is serviceable in a response to the problem 
of naturalism. Contemporary expressivists seek to do this in psychological terms, 
where the leading idea is to treat descriptive statements as expressive of 
representational mental states and ethical statements as expressive of some 
other nonrepresentational kind of mental state. However, when it comes to 
trying to articulate this distinction between representational and 
nonrepresentational mental states, the ordinary psychological terms 
‘belief/attitude won’t help because they render expressivism implausible or the 
distinction is vulnerable to creeping minimalism. And trying to make the 
distinction in technical psychological terms a la Gibbard doesn’t seem to help 
either, since it renders the distinction either conceptually independent of the 
problem of naturalism or, as we saw in the discussion of Dreier’s proposal, it 
implicitly depends on a distinction made in a way ultimately vulnerable to 
creeping minimalism. Do these failures mean that we should return to the 
semantic assumption implicit in the three original rivals to expressivism, viz. 
that the meaning of ethical statements is to be given in terms of which facts they 
represent?  
In my view, to return straightaway to that assumption is to overlook a 
third viable avenue of general semantic explanation. This is the inferentialist 
approach, which seeks to explain meaning (even of uncontroversially descriptive 
statements) in terms of inference rather than representation.21 The inferentialist 
approach to semantics doesn’t deny that the content of a statement is related to 
the content of the mental state that it conventionally expresses, but it reverses 
the order of explanation pursued in the psychologistic approach to semantics, 
which we have seen to be implicit in contemporary versions of metaethical 
expressivism. That is, the inferentialist approach encourages us to explain the 
content of mental states in terms of the content of statements that 
                                                
21 Brandom (1994, 2000) offers the most worked out articulation and defense of semantic 
inferentialism, but he traces the approach to Frege (1879), Sellars (1948, 1968), and Dummett (1973). 
Compare also Rosenberg (1974). 
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conventionally express these mental states, which in turn is explained in terms 
of their role in the socially-embodied inferential practice of making statements 
and giving and asking for reasons for these statements. So, for instance, the 
meaning of the statement “The moon is a roughly quarter of a million miles 
away” is, according to the inferentialist, constituted by its role in the practice of 
making statements and giving and asking for reasons. This comes, broadly 
speaking, to two things—(i) what circumstances license making the claim and 
(ii) what further statements and actions are licensed by the statement. In this 
case, the statement is licensed by things like testimony of an expert, the reading 
on a reliable measurement device, or a variety of other statements which 
materially imply this statement; and it licenses further statements such as “The 
moon is more than a hundred miles away”, “The moon is less than a million 
miles away”, etc. It is this complex of what we might call upstream and 
downstream inferential potential that constitutes the inferential role of the 
statement. And, according to semantic inferentialism, this role is basic in the 
explanation of the meaning of the statement. 
The three-way debate between those who pursue an inferentialist 
approach to semantics and those who pursue a psychologistic approach and 
those who pursue a more direct representationalist approach cuts deep into 
many philosophical controversies. My purpose here is not to enter that debate 
but rather to accomplish two more modest tasks: (i) to point out that, even 
though the contemporary metaethical debate about realism has been pursued 
(mostly) by investigating the semantics of ethical statements, the inferentialist 
approach to semantics has been largely ignored in this debate; and (ii) to argue 
that inferentialism has something significant to add to the development of a 
plausible version of expressivism.  
What I have to say in service of (i) is complete, so the remainder of the 
paper will be in service of (ii). What I think inferentialism has to offer here is the 
resources for a new form of expressivism that doesn’t fall prey to the problem of 
creeping minimalism. The key is what we started with—viz. the distinction 
between theoretical and practical reasoning. With both sorts of reasoning, one 
makes inferences by moving from premises to a conclusion; however, since the 
functions of these ways of reasoning in our cognitive lives are recognizably 
different, the proper relationship between the premises and the conclusion for 
each type of inference is also different. Generically, the premises of a theoretical 
inference should provide evidential support for the conclusion. When they do so 
adequately and one is committed to them, that is good theoretical reason to be 
committed to the conclusion. And when the conclusion is true, such a 
commitment will usually constitute theoretical knowledge about the world. By 
contrast, the premises of a practical inference should provide practical support 
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for the conclusion. When they do so and one is committed to the premises, that 
is good practical reason to be committed to the conclusion. And when the 
conclusion is true, such a commitment can constitute practical knowledge about 
how to interact with the world as we know it to be. 
 What is crucial here is that, since the inferentialist thinks that the 
meaning of a statement is constituted by its complex inferential-role, this 
distinction between theoretical and practical inferences will have direct semantic 
implications for the meaning of different kinds of statements. More specifically, 
when we look at the inferential-role of various sorts of statements—which, recall, 
is constituted by the complex pattern of things that license the statement and 
things that the statement licenses—some statements will have a recognizably 
practical component in that they can directly license particular actions, while 
others will lack this component in that they always require the support of some 
other practical premise in order to license particular actions. Recall the example 
with which I began. In this example, my partner and I inferred that the Joneses 
would arrive in 20 minutes. But, intuitively, the statement “The Joneses will 
arrive in 20 minutes” doesn’t license any particular action and it isn’t justified by 
a practical inference. What we need in order to get to an action is for that 
statement to dovetail with another statement with some practical inferential 
import. In the example, what happened was that we reasoned further from the 
desire to have the quiche ready shortly after the Joneses arrived to the 
conclusion that we should put the quiche in the oven now. And, intuitively, the 
statement “We should put the quiche in the oven” does license a particular 
action, namely, putting the quiche in the oven, and it is reached by a piece of 
practical reasoning. Given the inferentialist approach to semantics, this means 
that the statement “We should put the quiche in the oven” has a recognizably 
practical component in its meaning: it is licensed by statements which provide it 
inferential support in the way of practical reasoning and it directly licenses an 
action.22 
Articulating the fine structure of the inferential relations between various 
statements is no easy task, but the important point here is that, given the 
intuitive distinction between theoretical and practical reasoning, the semantic 
inferentialist will have to recognize a difference between, on the one hand, 
statements with theoretical inferential-roles and, on the other hand, statements 
                                                
22 James Dreier has suggested to me that Prior’s (1960) challenge to the principle that one 
cannot derive an ought from an is may cause a problem for thinking of all ethical statements as 
expressive of distinctively practical commitments. I remain unsure what to think about Prior’s 
counterexamples, which are somewhat peculiar counterexamples to the principle, but they at most 
challenge the idea that the upstream inferential potential of all ethical statements includes a practical 
commitment. The fact that ethical (and more generally normative) statements can license actions still 
distinguishes their inferential role from uncontroversially descriptive statements. 
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with practical inferential-roles. To use the idiom of expression, we might capture 
this idea by saying that some statements express theoretical commitments, while 
other statements express practical commitments—where the idea of expressing a 
commitment is used not to refer (directly) to the mental state conventionally 
conveyed by a statement but to the inferentially articulated place in the practice 
of making statements and giving and asking for reasons taken up by one who 
makes the statement. 
 This distinction between statements which express theoretical 
commitments and statements which express practical commitments is a wholly 
general implication of the inferentialist approach to semantics combined with 
recognition of the intuitive distinction between theoretical and practical 
reasoning. But its specific application to the metaethical debate discussed above 
is perhaps already coming into view.  
In that debate, expressivists sought to articulate an expressive contrast 
between ethical statements and uncontroversially descriptive statements, where 
this contrast needed to make a difference to the expressivist’s distinctive 
solution to the ontological and epistemological problem of naturalism. Ayer 
attempted this in a crude way: in effect, he treated descriptive statements and 
ethical statements as standing in different sorts of expression relations to their 
meanings. For Ayer, descriptive statements express propositions (i.e. truth-
evaluable contents), and ethical statements express feelings or attitudes but not 
propositions. As we saw, this seems to make the semantic explanation of ethical 
statements too different from the semantic explanation of descriptive statements 
to plausibly capture the apparent semantic similarities. This is why most 
contemporary expressivists have attempted to draw the distinction entirely in 
psychological terms: both descriptive and ethical statements express mental 
states, but the types of mental state expressed are different. This is more 
promising, but the various versions that have been proposed are, as we saw, 
threatened by minimalism’s tendency to undermine the realism-irrealism 
debate. 
Semantic inferentialism provides a new way to cast the realism-irrealism 
debate that, I think, leaves room for a plausible expressivist position within that 
debate. The distinction between theoretical and practical commitments was 
defined in terms of a distinction between types of inferential-roles—theoretical 
and practical—which, in turn, is a matter of the distinction between theoretical 
and practical reasoning. Since theoretical reasoning aims to increase our 
knowledge about the world, theoretical commitments can be seen as 
commitments about what reality is like. And, since practical reasoning aims to 
increase our knowledge about how to interact with the world as we know it to be, 
practical commitments can be seen as commitments about how to act, which 
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contrasts them with theoretical commitments. This underwrites the following 
way of construing the metaethical debate about realism: Ethical realism is the 
position that ethical statements express theoretical commitments and some of 
them are true. Irrealism is the denial of this conjunction. So, this conception of 
the debate leaves room for an error-theoretic form of irrealism, which says that 
ethical statements express theoretical commitments but none of the positive 
ethical statements are true. And, more importantly, there is also room for an 
expressivist form of irrealism, which says that ethical statements are 
semantically different from uncontroversially descriptive statements precisely in 
that they express practical commitments rather than theoretical commitments. 
This form of expressivism says that both descriptive statements and ethical 
statements express commitments—i.e. have inferential roles—but then 
distinguishes between what each kind of statement expresses in entirely in 
inferential terms. The fact that they both express commitments is the first step 
in capturing the apparent semantic similarities between descriptive and ethical 
statements, while the distinction between theoretical and practical reasoning 
allows us to articulate a new expressive contrast—viz., descriptive statements 
express theoretical commitments, while ethical statements express practical 
commitments. We might call this an inferentialist version of expressivism to 
distinguish it from previous psychologistic versions of expressivism. 
To fully flesh out and defend an inferentialist version of expressivism, one 
would need to explore the fine-structure of the inferentially articulated 
commitments expressed by ethical statements. This is a parallel but different 
task from the attempt by defenders of psychologistic versions of expressivism to 
explore the fine-structure of the psychologically embodied mental states 
expressed by ethical statements. Unlike the latter task, the former task doesn’t 
require us to locate the moral belief in syndrome of psychological causes of 
action23 but rather to locate the moral commitment in a syndrome of normative 
reasons for further commitments and actions. In either case, the project is highly 
speculative, but, in my view, not too speculative to be helpful for framing further 
investigations and articulating a metaethical view. 
It is in this speculative vein that a defender of an inferentialist version of 
expressivism would argue that, in ordinary ethical discourse, ethical statements 
seem to play a distinctively practical inferential-role. We have already seen how 
a statement such as “We should put the quiche in the oven” seems to have a 
distinctively practical inferential-role. This had two parts; first, what licenses the 
statement must include some other distinctively practical statement, and, 
                                                
23 Gibbard (1990: chapters 2, 4, 6, 7) and Blackburn (1998: 2, 3, 5) pursue a roughly 
functional-role approach to identifying what they see as the semantically relevant psychological state. 
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second, what the statement can license is an action.24 Many ethical statements 
seem similar. Consider, for instance, “One shouldn’t steal.” What licenses this 
statement? This is a complex issue, but two things seem relatively clear. First, 
this statement is rarely, or even never, plausibly thought of as an observation-
report. This means that its license will be other statements rather than the 
observation of some passing scene. Second, Moorean considerations seem to 
show us that this statement cannot be directly inferred from uncontroversially 
descriptive statements such as “I desire to desire not to steal” or “Stealing 
doesn’t maximize utility”. We seem to need some higher-order normative 
statement to justify the statement “One shouldn’t steal.” And, what does this 
statement license? This too is a complex issue, but it seems relatively clear that 
this statement can license the action of refraining from stealing. 
If these speculative remarks about the inferential role of “One shouldn’t 
steal” are on the right track, then the inferentialist expressivist will insist that 
this ethical statement is like the statement “We should put the quiche in the 
oven” in that they both express practical commitments, which distinguishes 
them from descriptive statements, which express theoretical commitments.  
 
V. Conclusion and Outstanding Issues 
It is unclear how far this inferentialist expressivist line could be pushed, but 
we’ve already got an example of how it works for an obvious paradigm of an 
ethical statement. So rather than push it further, let me conclude by exploring 
the question of how inferentialist versions of expressivism are better than 
psychologistic versions of expressivism. A central problem with the latter views, 
we’ve seen, is that they are forced to adopt minimalism about ‘truth’, 
‘proposition’, ‘belief’, ‘representation’, etc. in the quasi-realist inspired attempt 
to capture the features of ordinary discourse which tempt people to realism. But 
minimalism seems to undermine all of the ordinary terms with which the 
difference between expressivistic irrealism and realism is usually explained. We 
can try to save the debate by making a new distinction in stipulative 
psychological terms, but it is not clear how such stipulations really bear on the 
problem of naturalism or relate to the terms of ordinary discourse with which 
that problem is stated.  
By contrast, the difference in inferential-role that the inferentialist 
expressivist will argue for seems to be actually manifested in ordinary ethical 
discourse. The statement “One shouldn’t steal” is licensed by other statements 
standing in a practical inferential relation to this statement, and this statement 
                                                
24 These parts are inferential correlates to (and thus crucially different from) the causal inputs 
and outputs to moral beliefs that a functional-role approach uses to identify the relevant mental state. 
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license certain kinds of actions by standing in a practical inferential relation to 
them. This distinguishes ethical statements from uncontroversially descriptive 
statements such as “Stealing causes harm”, since these statements are licensed 
by other statements standing in a theoretical inferential relation to them, and 
they license only other descriptive statements which stand in a theoretical 
inferential relation to them. By marking the expressive contrast between 
descriptive statements and ethical statements in inferential terms, the 
inferentialist expressivist is not vulnerable to creeping minimalism. For, unlike 
the expressivist who states the contrast with realism in terms such as 
‘proposition’, ‘truth’, ‘belief’, or ‘representation’, the expressivist who states the 
contrast in inferential terms faces no pressure from ordinary discourse to 
abandon his contrast. But, importantly, this is not because the contrast is made 
in stipulative psychological terms. The inferentialist expressivist will grant that 
the contrast he seeks to draw is stated in technical terms—the idea of ‘expressing 
a commitment’ is stipulatively defined—but he will insist that the contrast is 
actually reflected in the ordinary practice of making statements and giving and 
asking for reasons. When we seek to justify ethical statements, we don’t look to 
the world or to statements standing in a theoretical inferential relation to the 
ethical statement. Rather we look for a higher-order statement that stands in 
practical inferential relation to the ethical statement. When we seek to justify 
our actions, appealing to an ethical statement which stands in a practical 
inferential relation to the action is a good and ordinary way to do so. 
At least, this is what the inferentialist expressivist will seek to show by 
articulating the relevant parts of the fine structure of the practice of making 
statements and giving and asking for reasons. I don’t take this speculative task 
to have been fully executed here. So, perhaps I should state my conclusion in the 
form of a proposal. What I have done here is to show how an inferentialist 
approach to semantics allows for a new way of drawing the realism-irrealism 
contrast in metaethics, which, in turn, allows for a new inferentialist version of 
metaethical expressivism. The view is that ethical statements express 
inferentially articulable practical commitments, and this distinguishes them 
from descriptive statements which express inferentially articulable theoretical 
commitments. Initial consideration of the dynamics of the part of the practice of 
making statements and giving and asking for reasons in which ethical 
statements are located appears to support this contrast; however, for all I have 
said here, it could turn out that inferentialist expressivism is wrong. What is 
important for my modest aspirations here is that, since the contrast between 
theoretical and practical commitments is not made in terms that are threatened 
by creeping minimalism, it provides a new way to approach the question of 
realism in metaethics. The idea is to investigate further whether ethical 
statements truly do express practical commitments as the inferentialist 
 22 
expressivist supposes or theoretical commitments as the realist supposes. By 
framing this question inferentially, we save the debate and, I think, hope for 
expressivists who want to adopt some form of minimalism as a way to capture 
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